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CONTEMPT OF COURT AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees the people the right to remain free of unreasonable searches and
seizures.' To enforce this guarantee against the police, the judiciary cre-
ated the exclusionary rule.2 Reappraisals of the rule's effectiveness and
benefits have appeared in Supreme. Court decisions3 and scholarly
I "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated ... " U.S. CONST. amend
IV.
2 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1973). Under the exclusionary rule,
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used against the victim of
an illegal search or seizure. Id at 347. Many scholars have reiterated the idea that the exclu-
sionary rule is a product of the courts. See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE:
THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 1 (1977); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,433 (1974). However, many other scholars contend
that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Shrock & Welsh, Up from
Calandra: The Exclusionay Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974);
Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exc/usionag Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 338, 368-75
(1980).
The Supreme Court first ordered illegally obtained evidence excluded in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), Justice Day
analyzed the history of the fourth amendment and concluded that unless certain evidence
seized in violation of the Constitution was excluded from federal prosecution, "[t]he protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment is of no value." Id at 393. The rule was applied to the states
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 The most extensive Supreme Court critique of the exclusionary rule is Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agent, 403 U.S. 388
(197 1). After a detailed analysis of exclusion as an "anomalous and ineffective mechanism,"
id at 420, Burger called for Congress to evaluate the rule and develop a more effective alter-
native. Id at 422-24. In his concurrence in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
Justice Harlan called for an overhaul of search and seizure law, beginning with the overruling
of Mapp. Id at 490. Burger and Harlan's demands for reappraisal were not the first time
Supreme Court justices criticized the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (Justice Taft stated that exclusion "would make society suffer and
give criminals greater immunity than has been known heretofore.")
Burger's dissent signaled the Court's gradual rejection of the primacy of the exclusionary
rule. The Court has found a number of situations where the rule's deterrent effect on police
violations of the fourth amendment did not justify the harm caused by the suppression of
relevant and incriminating evidence. Recent decisions have prohibited the rule's application
in: searches following arrests under presumptively valid statutes later held unconstitutional,
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); habeas corpus proceedings, Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); and grand jury hearings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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works.4 Many alternatives to the rule have been suggested and evalu-
ated.5 One novel alternative, contempt of court sanctions against police
officers, has been mentioned frequently6 but has not been given exten-
Some observers have concluded the Court is ready to abandon or modify the exclusionary
rule. See 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
21 (1978); The Supreme Court 1979-80 Term-Exclusionag Rule, 27 CRIM. L. REP. 4137 (BNA)
(July 23, 1980).
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. The Fifth Circuit recently held
that illegally seized evidence could not be suppressed as long as police acted in good faith.
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980). Four current members of the
United States Supreme Court, Justices Powell, Rehnquist and White, and Chief Justice Bur-
ger, have urged the adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Ball, Good
Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionay Rule, 69 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 635 (1978).
4 See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2; Wilkey, The Exclsionagy Rule: Why Suppress Valid
Evidence, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 232 (1978). See also Schlesinger & Wilson, Property, Privacy and
Deterrence: The Exclusionay Rule in Search ofa Rationale, 18 Duo. L. REV. 225, 227 (1980) (call
for reconsideration of the rule's basic rationale).
5 There have been so many alternatives suggested that we can only list a sample of them:
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964) (civilian review boards);
Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionagy Rule. A Proposal, 4
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 317 (1973) (independent government official to punish police illegality);
Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims Act: An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C.
1 (1975) (tort suits against police); Gottlieb, Feedbackftom the Fourth Amendment: Is the Exclusion-
agy Rule An Albatross Around theJudicial Neck?, 67 Ky. L.J. 1007, 1013 (1979) (tort suits against
police); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclsionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1050-53 (1974)
(internal police discipline); Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionaq Rule for Fourth Amendment
Violations, 58 JUDICATURE 74 (1974) (joint liability insurance plan). For an excellent analysis
of exclusionary rule alternatives, see generally Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Elu-
sionar Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 684-722.
6 Cases which have mentioned the contempt alternative include: State v. Baker, 78
Wash. 2d 327, 332, 474 P.2d 254, 258 (1970); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733,
742, 409 P.2d 867, 873 (1966) (Finley, J., dissenting); McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 542-
43, 398 P.2d 732, 740-41 (1965) (Finley, J., concurring).
Respected scholars have considered the contempt alternative in their treatises. See, e.g.,
C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50-51 (1980); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a at
31, n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
The articles and comments suggesting contempt or contempt-like proceedings are nu-
merous. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Contempt of Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTGERS L. REV.
526 (1957); Finley, Who Is on Trial-The Police, The Courts., or the Criminally Accused?, 57 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 379, 386 (1966); Gangi, Confessions: Historical Perspective and a Proposal, 10
HoUs. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (1973); Geller, supra note 5, at 717; Gorecki, Miranda and Bcond-
The Fifth Amendment Reconsidered, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 295, 309; Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 171, 182-83 (1962) (conditional
agreement with concept); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 674 (1970); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORN. L.Q. 337, 388 (1939).
Comment, Use of§ 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Use of§ 1983].
A number of others have treated the contempt alternative unfavorably. See, e.g., Allee v.
Mendrano, 416 U.S. 802, 858 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Note, The
Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143, 151 (1968);
Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 162-63 (1948) [hereinafter cited
asJudicial Control].
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sive analysis. 7 This Comment will critically examine contempt of court
sanctions as an alternative to the exclusionary rule.
I. CONTEMPT AS AN ALTERNATIVE
The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to safeguard
fourth amendment rights. This view, recently articulated in United States
v. Calandra8 and subsequent decisions,9 differs from the earlier Mapp v.
Ohio '0 concept of exclusion as an "essential part" of the fourth amend-
ment's limitation upon the encroachment of individual privacy." The
Court's movement away from characterizing exclusion as constitution-
ally mandated is significant for consideration of alternatives. If exclu-
sion of evidence is not required by the fourth amendment, 12 the rule
could be readily replaced by alternatives which can more effectively ac-
complish the rule's purposes while avoiding its considerable draw-
backs.' 3
The exclusionary rule has not been successful in accomplishing its
goals. The primary justification for the rule is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates the fourth amendment.14 The Court viewed the
rule as deterring police misconduct by "removing the incentive to disre-
7 Of the works listed in note 6 supra, only Professor Blumrosen's 1957 article thoroughly
examined contempt of court as an alternative. He focused on the use of contempt sanctions
to punish the delay of preliminary hearings as an obstruction ofjustice. See Blumrosen, supra
note 6, at 537-40. The late Washington Supreme Court Justice, Judge Robert Finley, cham-
pioned the contempt alternative from the bench. His consideration of contempt in his dissent
in McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d at 542-43, 398 P.2d at 740-41, is the lengthiest examination
of the alternative in any reported opinion.
The Israeli criminal justice system deals with illegal police searches by allowing the evi-
dence to be used at the defendant's trial while punishing the misbehaving officer in a proceed-
ing similar to American contempt actions. See Cohn, The Exc/usionay Rule Under Foreign Law:
Israel, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 282 (1961).
8 414 U.S. at 348: "The rule is ajudicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights, generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
tional right of the party aggrieved."
9 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482, 486.
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 Id at 656-57.
12 Justice Black remarked in his opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire that "nothing in
the Fourth Amendment provides that evidence seized in violation of that Amendment must
be excluded." 403 U.S. at 498. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 499 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (exclusion is "a purely judge-created device").
13 "If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for official observance of the
law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
14 The primacy of deterrence in the hierarchy of exclusionary rule justifications has been
repeatedly confirmed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at
347; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). See also 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 17; Sunderland, supra
note 2, at 365.
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gard" the fourth amendment.' 5 However, the evidence supporting the
rule's deterrent effect on police is, at best, inconclusive.' 6 The rule has
also been described as a means to protect judicial integrity by insulating
the courts from the taint of illegally obtained evidence.' 7 Yet, by sup-
pressing reliable evidence from a criminal trial, the rule may undermine
judicial integrity by interfering with the courts' duties to pursue truth
and to punish the guilty.' 8
15 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 217. This incentive is removed by not permitting
any evidence obtained by police in violation of the Constitution to be used in subsequent
criminal proceedings.
16 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 492 n.32. In the same opinion, Justice Powell noted that
there is an absence of supportive empirical evidence for the rule's deterrent effect. Id Many
studies have attempted to answer whether the exclusionary rule is an effective deterrent. See
generally S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 50-60. Although most observers do not believe
these studies have been conclusive, see, e.g., Canon, The Excusionag Rule: Have Critics Proven
That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398, 403 (1979); Sunderland, supra note 2, at 368,
others maintain that these studies either demonstrate or refute the rule's deterrent value. See,
e.g., Kamisar, Does the Exclusionay Rule Affect Police Behavior, 62 JUDICATURE 70 (1978) (doubts
cast on studies showing rule's ineffectiveness); Schlesinger, The Exclusionag Rule: Have Propo-
nents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404, 405 (1979) (studies indicate the
rule's ineffectiveness).
As Professor Oaks observed in his article, the determination of the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule is an "exceedingly complicated inquiry into human motivation within a
complex social model, the criminal police system." Oaks, supra note 6, at 715. He concluded
that to design any single test or group of tests that could measure the deterrent effect would
be impossible. Id at 716. Professor Canon believes that without a test, empirical claims that
the rule does or does not work cannot be made. Canon, supra at 403. However, Professor
Schlesinger replies that the proponents of the rule have the burden of proving its effectiveness
due to the primary importance of deterrence as a rationale for the rule and to the rule's many
costs and disadvantages. "If the proponents of the rule are unable to show that it is an effec-
tive deterrent, then it is time for the [Supreme] Court to reconsider its position." Schlesinger,
A Rep.'y to Professor Canon, 62 JUDICATURE 457 (1979).
'7 Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
is generally regarded as the source of the judicial integrity argument. Justice Brandeis argued
that exclusion preserved the judicial process from contamination by preventing courts from
impliedly approving illegal conduct through the admission of unlawfully seized evidence. Id
at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
A third argument for exclusion involves the maintenance of trust in government. Justice
Brennan in his dissent in Calandra observed that exclusion assured all people "that the govern-
ment would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously under-
mining popular trust in government." 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Sunderland, supra note 2, at 348-51 (concise analysis of both arguments described above).
The Supreme Court has not relied on these arguments in its recent decisions involving
the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48. Seegenerall C.
WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, at 14.
18 See S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 86-87; Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test: A Flexible
Approach to the Exclusiona9, Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1, 25 (1975); Wilkey, supra note 4, at 223.
Dean Paulsen has observed that the "rule destroys respect for law because it provides the
spectacle of the courts letting the guilty go free." Paulsen, The Exclusionag Rule and Mirconduct
by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961).
One of the major criticisms of the exclusionary rule is its suppression of reliable evidence,
often the most probative evidence of the guilt of the defendant. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at
490; S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 62. In contrast, the evidence typically obtained from
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Contempt of court sanctions could be a more satisfactory remedy
for fourth amendment violations than suppression. Courts use the con-
tempt power to punish acts of disobedience or disrespect.' 9 If creation
and enforcement of the exclusionary rule demonstrates the courts' spe-
cial desire to safeguard fourth amendment rights, an unreasonable
search or seizure could be construed as a serious instance of disrespect or
disobedience of the judiciary. By using its contempt power against the
police, the courts could directly and efficiently punish the misconduct
while at the same time permitting reliable evidence to be used at trial.
The goals of exclusion, particularly deterrence,20 could be more effec-
tively accomplished without the rule's accompanying drawbacks.
A simple hypothetical, based on the suggestion of Dean Wigmore, 2 1
demonstrates the utility of a contempt alternative. Darryl Dogooder has
coerced confessions or flawed lineup identifications is properly suppressed because of its inher-
ent unreliability. Wilkey, supra note 4, at 227, n.49. Ifjustice is a truthseeking process, id. at
222, the exclusion of reliable evidence is not only a distortion of truth but an obstruction of
justice as well.
In his often quoted opinion in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), then
Chief Judge Cardozo laments the possible consequence of suppression:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. . . . A room is searched
against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may
not be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with
the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed and the murderer goes free.
Id at 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. at 587, 588.
19 R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
20 See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 71.
Deterrence is a complex concept dependent on a number of variables, including the
severity and certainty of punishment and the individual's knowledge of the law and its pre-
scribed sanctions. Set, e.g., Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. GRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 347, 348 (1955). The deterrent value of the contempt alternative would depend, in
part, on how willing courts would be to punish police officers for their fourth amendment
violations.
This Comment's position, that police officers would be more effectively deterred from
fourth amendment violations by the threat of direct punishment than by the possible suppres-
sion of evidence, is necessarily based on intuition. Since the contempt alternative has never
been tried, data on its deterrent value are not available. Moreover, studies which have been
done on the deterrent effect of exclusion have not been conclusive. Se note 16 supra. Finally,
marginal deterrence, which considers whether one sanction is a more effective deterrent than
another, requires specialized research well beyond the scope of this Comment. (For a detailed
study on marginal deterrence, see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).) When scientific certainty is unavailable, judges have
used "common experience and introspective reports" to evaluate the deterrent value of pun-
ishment. See United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Judge Frankel
approves imprisonment for defendants convicted of tax fraud).
21 Dean John Henry Wigmore, in his landmark treatise on evidence, proposed a contempt
alternative in these words:
The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy principle of the
Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending for the high handed, over-zealous marshal
who had searched without a warrant, imposing a 30-day imprisonment for his contempt
of the constitution and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the convicted criminal.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 6.
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just had his wallet stolen from his back pocket. Darryl locates a police-
man on patrol in the area, Officer Bumbling, and tells him about the
crime. Although Dogooder never saw the pickpocket, Bumbling knows
that a reputed pickpocket, Quincy Quigley, has been in the area. Sev-
eral hours later, Bumbling bumps into Quigley. He immediately stops
Quigley and, without a word of explanation, conducts a thorough pat-
down search. He finds in Quigley's back pocket a wallet which contains
Dogooder's identification and credit cards. Quigley is arrested, booked
and stands trial for petty theft. Despite the unlawful search of Quigley,
the wallet and its contents would not be excluded but would be used at
trial as evidence of Quigley's guilt. Quigley is eventually convicted on
the basis of that evidence. Then, after announcing Quigley's sentence,
the judge informs Bumbling that because of the unlawful search of the
defendant, he is guilty of contempt and must pay a $100 fine.
22
The contempt of court sanction presents an attractive alternative to
the exclusionary rule in this hypothetical. Highly probative evidence
was admitted at the defendant's trial, and both wrongdoers, the pick-
pocket and the policeman, received direct, proportionate punishment
from the court. Moreover, the officer will probably think twice before
he makes an illegal search in similar circumstances. Despite these ad-
vantages, however, a contempt alternative would have significant flaws
which would limit its practical scope. Before the practicality of apply-
ing this contempt alternative to all, or even some, 23 instances of police
misconduct can be evaluated, the components of the contempt power
should be examined.
II. THE CONTEMPT POWER
A. HISTORY
The power of the courts to punish contempts arose from the divine
right of kings. The medieval monarch possessed absolute power and au-
thority, 24 and subjects owed complete obedience to the king. As his
22 If he were the judge, Dean Wigmore might have assessed a stiffer sentence. See note 21
supra. Also, Wigmore's "contempt of the Constitution" is not a legal concept. He may have
been calling for punishment of the police misconduct by any means or treating the Constitu-
tion as a set of court rules, violation of which would justify a contempt sanction. See Blum-
rosen, supra note 6, at 526, n.4. In any event, the step from Wigmore's contempt of the
Constitution to contempt of court is not a long one. Id at n.3.
23 Professor Blumrosen suggested that the contempt power might be initially applied to a
narrow area of police misconduct so as to gauge its deterrent effect. If it proved to be an
effective deterrent, the remedy he proposed would then be extended into other areas by legis-
lative or judicial action. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 545.
24 R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 11. Although the formal contempt power began during
the Middle Ages, many older societies had similar schemes which also sought to assure respect
for the governing sovereign. See id at 9-10.
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kingdom grew, the monarch selected chancellors and judges to represent
him in certain governing duties. Disobedience of their writs or orders
was considered "a grievous contempt of the king."'25 Contempt of the
king gradually evolved into contempt of the administration of justice.26.
By the early eighteenth century, British courts could use summary con-
victions to punish a wide variety of contempts committed within and
outside the courtroom.27 This same extensive power was used by Ameri-
can colonial courts.
28
Americans saw the potential for judicial abuse of an unfettered con-
tempt power. The Judiciary Act of 1789 vested in federal courts the
power to punish by fine or imprisonment 29 any contempt of their au-
thority. In 1826, Judge James Peck's controversial use of the contempt
power to punish the author of an article that criticized Peck triggered
strong protests.3 0 The outcry led to passage of an Act in 1831 which
restricted the courts' contempt power to three defined classes. The cur-
rent federal statute limits the contempt power to the same three catego-
ries.3 '
B. TYPES OF CONTEMPT
Contempt of court has been called the "Proteus of the Legal
World, '3 2 because it is capable of great diversity of form. In fact, the
many forms of contempt have unnecessarily complicated the under-
standing of this judicial power.33 The following discussion will focus on
25 Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REv. 161, 166 (1908).
26 This change was strongly influenced by a controversial decision by Judge Wilmot in an
unpublished 1764 British case, Rex v. Almon. For a discussion about this complicated case, see
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 16-19.
27 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185 (1958).
28 R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 19.
29 Federal courts had the power "to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of
said courts, all contempts of authority in any case or hearing before same..." Judiciary Act
of 1789 § 17, 1 STAT. 83.
30 James Peck was a federal judge who held a Missouri attorney in contempt for publish-
ing an article that criticized the judge's decision in a series of pending proceedings concerning
land grants. Judge Peck narrowly avoided impeachment as a result of his action. See Nelles
& King, Contempt hy Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 410, 423-30 (1928).
31 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1966):
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
its discretion, such contempt of its authority and none other as:
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or com-
mand.
For further discussion of the contempt statute, see notes 86-97 & accompanying text infla.
32 Moskovitz, Contempt ofInjunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780 (1943).
33 R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 46.
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the two uniformly accepted3 4 classifications: civil and criminal, and di-
rect and indirect.
The purpose of the trial court's issuance of the contempt judgment
determines whether the contempt is civil or criminal. 35 Civil contempt
sanctions coerce or repair-they seek to enforce compliance with a
pending court order or to compensate a party injured by noncompli-
ance.36 Whereas civil contempt lies for refusal to do a commanded act,
criminal contempt punishes the completion of some forbidden act.
37
Criminal contempt sentences aim to vindicate the court's authority and
to deter future acts of disrespect. 38 Fourth amendment violations by the
police probably would be punished as criminal rather than civil con-
tempt because courts would want to punish the officer's misconduct and
34 Id at 47.
35 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966); Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d
1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1980). The contempt proceeding or sentence is classified as civil or crimi-
nal, not the contumacious conduct.
A given act might be subject to both civil and criminal contempt sanctions, and both
may be imposed in the same proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330
U.S. 258 (1947) (Supreme Court approves civil and criminal sanctions against union and its
leaders for refusing to obey court order to end nationwide strike). Seegeneral/y Dobbs, Contempt
of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 236-37 (1971).
Professor Dobbs notes that while both types of contempt can be used in the same pro-
ceeding, most courts seek the dominant purpose of the proceeding and classify the contempt
accordingly. Id at 238.
36 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04.
A federal district court recently sought to achieve both aims by holding the super-
intendant of a woman's penitentiary in civil contempt for failing to comply with a prior court
order regarding prison disciplinary procedures. Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Stipp. 917 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). The superintendant was fined $5,000 plus $1,000 for every additional day of noncom-
pliance with the order. The court believed the fine was needed to: (1) demonstrate to the
defendants the seriousness with which the court viewed their noncompliance; and (2) gener-
ate the effort necessary for prompt and meaningful compliance. Furthermore, to make repa-
rations to the inmates injured by the defendants' noncompliance, the court ordered the
expungement of all records of disciplinary proceedings conducted in violation of the court
order, and the payment of the inmates' attorneys' fees and nominal damages. Id. at 934-36.
One author has criticized the use of contempt as a means of compensating victims of
noncompliance through the payment of monetary damages. Rendleman, Compensatog, Con-
tempt to Collect Mone, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (1980). He believes that this use of contempt
springs from the outdated notion of the courts possessing a "roving commission under an
inherent contempt power." Id at 635. He calls for courts to restrict the exercise of contempt
powers to their statutory limits and to be skeptical of "achieving perfect solutions with blunt
judicial remedies." Id at 636.
37 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442-43 (1911) (this case has been
called the leading case on contempt; see, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 35, at 239); Skinner v. White,
505 F.2d 685, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1974) (concise outline of some distinctions between civil and
criminal contempt).
38 In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may properly take into
consideration the extent of the willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order, the
seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effectively
terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the public interest and the impor-
tance of deterring such acts in the future.
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303.
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deter similar violations in the future.39
Civil and criminal contempts require different sanctions. Courts
can use fines or imprisonment for either type of contempt.40 Since its
purpose is usually coercive, however, the civil contempt sanction is inde-
terminate-the punishment may only last until the contemnor purges
himself of his unclean conduct.4 1 The criminal sanction, on the other
hand, is definite and unconditional. It need not terminate following the
contemnor's pledge not to repeat his offense.42 Moreover, a court would
not need to monitor the contemnor's conduct when it issues a determi-
nate sentence.43 The weakness of indeterminate civil contempt sanc-
tions to enforce police compliance with the fourth amendment was
demonstrated in Lance v. Plummer," a civil rights case where the deter-
rent effect of the contempt sanction was questionable, since the offend-
39 When considering contempt sanctions, courts must exercise "[t]he least possible power
adequate to the end proposed." Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821). This
language has been interpreted to require judges to consider coercive civil contempt sanctions
before resorting to the punitive criminal contempt measures. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. at 371 n.9 (contempt for refusal to testify). But, since the purposes of any
sanction against police are to punish the completed misconduct and to deter future violations,
courts could justify the use of the criminal contempt power. See text accompanying notes
130-37 infa.
40 18 U.S.C. § 401. A criminal contempt sanction cannot consist of both a fine and impris-
onment. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); United States v. DiGirlomo, 548 F.2d 252, 253
(8th Cir. 1977). The amount of the punishment is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 188; Keyes v. United States, 314 F.2d 123
(9th Cir. 1963).
41 The civil contemnor has often been described as carrying the keys of his prison in his
own pocket. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). This phrase refers to the fact that
the civil contemnor's decision to comply with the court's order is all that is necessary to termi-
nate his sanction.
In Powell v. Ward, the court's civil contempt sanction, an escalating fine, would be drop-
ped if the prison superintendant achieved compliance within thirty days. After thirty days,
the fine would cease increasing on the day the order was complied with. 487 F. Supp. at 935.
42 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. at 442.
43 In Powell, the federal district court had to appoint a special master to expedite compli-
ance efforts and to serve as the court's "eyes and ears." 487 F. Supp. at 935. A civil contempt
sentence will often require some post-sentencing monitoring by the court so that the time of
compliance can be determined.
44 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966). A federal district court
had issued injunctions against members of various "social groups," including the Ku Klux
Klan, as well as against motel and restaurant owners, enjoining them from intimidating
blacks who sought to use various public facilities in Saint Augustine, Florida. Charles Lance,
an unsalaried deputy sheriff and a member of one of the enjoined groups, was adjudged to be
in civil contempt for his abusive treatment of certain blacks. Id at 589-90. The district
court's punishment, requiring Lance's immediate dismissal and forbidding him from serving
as a peace officer in the future, was modified by the Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit held
that, because the contempt was civil, the sanction had to be open-ended to give Lance an
opportunity to purge himself. If he promised to comply with the injunction's terms, Lance
could be permitted to return as a deputy. Id at 592.
If civil contempt sanctions were used against police officers on a regular basis, the issuing
court would have trouble determining when, and whether, the officer had "purged" himself.
COMMENTS
ing officer was merely required to promise not to repeat his abusive
treatment of blacks.
Prosecutors would need to meet a higher standard of proof to se-
cure a criminal, as opposed to a civil, contempt conviction. In a civil
contempt action, the proof of the defendant's conduct must be clear and
convincing,4 5 a higher standard than the preponderance of the evidence
standard commonly required in civil cases. In criminal contempt cases,
the prosecutor bears the more. difficult burden of proving the contem-
nor's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
46
The intent requirements for civil and criminal contempt differ sig-
nificantly. Willfulness need not be shown for a civil contempt convic-
tion47-the mere fact of noncompliance or disrespect is sufficient to
support the coercive penalty.48 A criminal contempt conviction, how-
ever, requires some showing of willfulness by the alleged contemnor.
49
Confusion surrounds the intent requirement for criminal contempt
because courts have taken inconsistent approaches to defining the requi-
site mental state.50 Courts generally agree that the defendant's mental
state must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, 5' and that intent can
be inferred from the actor's conduct.52 Courts disagree, however, on the
degree of intent that must be proven. Debates have focused on what the
defendant must actually have intended53 and how that intent will be
Moreover, most officers would not consider promising to "not do it again" to be a severe
sanction.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976).
46 See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924); In re Stewart, 571 F.2d
958, 965 (5th Cir. 1978). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for any criminal con-
viction. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 52 (1972).
47 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
48 Inability to comply, ifshown clearly and categorically by defendants, is a valid defense
to a civil contempt motion. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330-34 (1950). However,
since civil contempt aims only to coerce compliance or to repair damage, the state of mind of
the alleged contemnor is not relevant to his guilt.
49 See generalky Dobbs, supra note 35, at 261-65; Kuhns, The Summa,7 Contempt Power: A
Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39, 50-51 (1978).
50 Compare three circuits' descriptions of the intent requirement for criminal contempt:
"willfully, contumaciously, intentionally, with a wrongful state of mind," Richmond Black
Police Officers v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 1977); "willful, contumacious
or reckless state of mind," In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1975); "a volitional act done
by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful," United States
v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 368 (7th Cir. 1972).
The courts have acknowledged this confusion, but have not sought to reconcile it. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 555 F.2d 249, 252 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The formulation of the
requisite intent cannot be expected to be uniform in all contexts.").
51 See, e.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Cf Dobbs, supra note 35, at
262 & n.325 (intent sometimes only required to be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence).
52 See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoT, supra note 46, at 202-03.
53 Dobbs, supra note 35, at 262-63. Professor Dobbs examined four ways in which the
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shown.54 Ultimately, the degree of willfulness that a court requires will
affect the deterrent potential of the contempt alternative. If a court's
intent requirement is difficult to meet, prosecutors will rarely be able to
secure contempt convictions.5 5 A slight chance of punishment will
hardly be an adequate deterrent to police misbehavior.
The location of contumacious behavior determines whether a con-
tempt is direct or indirect. Direct contempt generally takes place within
the presence of the court.5 6 Disruptions in the courtroom and insults to
the judge are two examples of direct contempt. Indirect contempt con-
sists of all misbehavior of which the court has no firsthand knowledge.
57
Thus, police misconduct would almost always be classified as indirect
contempt.
The distinction between direct and indirect determines the type of
hearing an alleged contemnor receives. Some direct contempts can be
punished summarily, without affording the contemnor any notice or for-
mal hearing.58 Summary contempt has been confined to extraordinary
situations where instant action is necessary to vindicate the court's au-
thority or prevent obstruction of justice.5 9 When the contempt is indi-
allegedly contumacious disobedience of a court order might be regarded as willful: (I) the
defendant intended both to violate the order and to express defiance in doing so; (2) the
defendant intended to disobey the order; (3) the defendant intended to perform the conduct
which violated the order; or (4) the defendant's action was of a "particularly bad quality."
Dobbs concludes that an acceptable standard for willfulness should at least include the con-
temnor's realization of his disobedience.
54 Kuhns, supra note 49, at 50-51. Professor Kuhns notes that certain courts require a
showing of subjective criminal intent, "thereby implying that the defendant must actually
intend to act wrongfully or, at least, be aware of the likelihood that his conduct is wrongful."
Other courts use an objective test that focuses not on the defendant's perceived state of mind
but on "what a reasonable person would have been aware of."
55 Id at 51. Professor Kuhns believed this would be especially true if the subjective test
for intent was used by a court. See note 54 supra.
56 Direct contempts have been referred to as those which occur "under [the] eye and
within the hearing of the court." United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1974)
(quoting Erparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888)).
57 The best example of indirect contempt would be disobedience of a judicial order to be
performed outside the courtroom. See Dobbs, supra note 35, at 224-25.
58 Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits summary contempt
punishment "if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the con-
tempt" and if the contumacious act was committed in the actual presence of the court. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 42(a). The summary power has been thoroughly examined. See general'y N.
DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE CouRT 220-30, 232-38 (1973); Kuhns, supra note
49; Sedler, The Summag Contempt Power and the Constitution: The Viewfrom Without and Within, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 34 (1976).
59 The Supreme Court in Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965), stated that
the summary contempt power should be reserved for exceptional circumstances such as acts
threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings. The Court
has justified punishment without a hearing for some direct contempts because the acts oc-
curred in the judge's presence and were within his knowledge. Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1, 9 (1952). More recently, in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975), the Court
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rect, or when there is no "overriding necessity for instant action to
preserve order," 60 the summary contempt power cannot be used.
6 1
Since fourth amendment violations by police generally occur outside the
courtroom and cannot receive immediate judicial attention, they cannot
be dealt with summarily. Due process requirements must be met.
C. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
An officer facing a possible contempt conviction is entitled to a
number of procedural guarantees. Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires notice and hearing for contempt proceed-
ings.
62
The notice required for contempt proceedings must provide the es-
sential facts constituting the contempt, but need not have the technical
accuracy of an indictment.6 3 Rather, the notice should be sufficiently
particular to inform the officer of the events constituting the contempt
so as to give him a fair opportunity to defend himself.64 The contempt
should be designated as civil or criminal. 65 The notice can be delivered
in various forms. The judge can orally notify the officer of the contempt
upheld summary contempt convictions of immunized witnesses who refused to obey a court
order to testify at a criminal trial. It emphasized that summary punishment is permissible
where the trial judge must act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from dis-
rupting the orderly progress of a criminal trial. Id at 319. Lower courts have interpreted
Wilson as holding that summary punishment is appropriate only where there is a compelling
need for immediate action. See, e.g., In re Gustafson, 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1248 (5th Cir. 1977).
60 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
61 The Supreme Court in Wilson noted that in situations where time is not of the essence,
due process provisions of Rule 42(b) would be more appropriate in dealing with the contuma-
cious conduct. 421 U.S. at 319. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (usual due process
requirements must be afforded if conduct is not in open court and not in the judge's immedi-
ate presence).
62 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). Although this rule is entitled "Criminal Contempt," many
circuits have held that the notice requirements of Rule 42(b) apply to civil contempt proceed-
ings as well. See, e.g., Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 966 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Eichhorst, 544 F.2d 1383, 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1976). In fact, a
criminal contemnor has no due process right to an indictment. Green v. United States, 356
U.S. at 183-85.
64 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 297 (the notice should fairly and
accurately inform the officer of the events and conduct constituting the alleged contempt);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
See generally N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 230; L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES, § 42.29 (1967).
65 Although Rule 42(b) requires that the notice designate the contempt charged as crimi-
nal or civil, the failure to do so does not necessarily invalidate contempt findings. If the
defendants know the criminal nature of the charge and are accorded the appropriate proce-
dural safeguards, the omission will not be fatal. See United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 297 at 297-98; United States v. Eichhorst, 544 F.2d at 1386; FTC v. Gladstone, 450
F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1971).
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charge during the criminal defendant's trial. 66 An order to show cause
why the defendant should not be held in contempt can be issued by the
trial judge or upon application of the contempt prosecutor.67 An arrest
order 68 or even an indictment 69 would satisfy the notice requirements.
The time and place of the contempt hearing must be stated in the
notice.70 The officer must be given reasonable time to prepare a de-
fense. Although the trial court has discretion in the amount of time it
can provide,71 contempt convictions have been overturned on this is-
sue.72 A fair interval would become standard after initial experimenta-
tion. Thus, following the criminal defendant's trial, the judge would tell
the officer charged with contempt that he had a certain number of days
to return to court to defend himself.
The hearing for an officer charged with contempt serves a number
of purposes. To impose a just punishment, a sentencing judge should
know all the facts surrounding the officer's conduct.73 Disputed issues
can be properly resolved at a full hearing. 74 At the hearing, the officer
should be able to call witnesses and receive the assistance of counsel in
order to exculpate himself or to prove extenuating or mitigating circum-
stances.
75
66 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
67 L. ORFIELD, supra note 64, at § 42.28.
The order to show cause is the most widely used method for giving notice to alleged
contemnors. See Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Ro/esfor the Prosecutor and the
GrandJuqy, 73 MICH. L. REv. 484, 489 (1975).
68 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
69 Kuhns, supra note 67, at 488 (notice is occasionally given by the return of a grand jury
indictment; no court has disapproved this method). See, e.g., United States v. Mensik, 440
F.2d 1232, 1234 (4th Cir. 1971).
70 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
71 Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 395 (1957). As little as one or two days has been
upheld as reasonable time for preparation in uncomplicated cases. See, e.g., In re Timmons,
607 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1979) (two days, criminal contempt); United States v. Hawkins,
501 F.2d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1974) (one day, civil contempt).
72 See In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court of Appeals ruled that the
defendant did not have reasonable time to prepare a defense to his contempt charge where
the order to show cause had been signed in the morning and the hearing was held in the
afternoon. Id at 965.
73 Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. at 166.
74 Dobbs, supra note 35, at 229. Professor Dobbs calls for a full hearing whenever there
are disputed issues.
75 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. at 537. At their hearings, contempt defendants have
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273, 275, the right
to an impartial judge, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-03 (1974), and the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. at 444.
The assistance of counsel has been acknowledged as essential to an effective defense.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). Nonetheless, if imprisonment of a police of-
ficer was not being considered in the contempt proceeding, counsel would not need to be
provided by the state. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1971).
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The right to a jury trial for contempt cases has changed signifi-
cantly in recent years. The Supreme Court has gradually moved away
from its previous position that any criminal contempt could be punished
without a jury.7 6 In Chefv. Schnackenberg,77 the Court held that criminal
contempt sentences exceeding six months may not be imposed without a
jury trial.78 In Bloom v. llinois, 79 the Court concluded that the Constitu-
tion required 80 a jury trial in contempt cases where serious punishment
was contemplated.8 '
The Court has not mandated jury trials for all criminal contempts.
Bloom declared that criminal contempt was a crime,8 2 but added that it
was not an offense that required a jury trial regardless of the potential
penalty. 83 If a jury could be requested in every criminal contempt case,
the efficiency of the contempt alternative would be minimal. Therefore,
if a six-month maximum were imposed on imprisonment terms for pol-
ice contempt,8 4 the contempt punishment would not be considered seri-
ous,85 and a burdensome addition to the alternative would be avoided.
76 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 187: "The principle that criminal contempts of
court are not required to be tried by a jury. . . is firmly rooted in our traditions."
77 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
78 Id at 380. Six month imprisonment was treated as the dividing line between petty and
serious punishments. Id at 379. The Court observed that, historically, petty sentences could
be administered without jury trials. Since Cheff received a six-month prison sentence, he
could be convicted without a jury trial.
79 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
80 The Chef decision was not of a constitutional dimension, but was made under the
Court's supervisory power over federal courts. The Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), held that the right to a jury trial for serious offenses was guaranteed for both
federal and state trials by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, respectively. Thus, the con-
stitutional quality of the Bloom ruling enabled it to apply equally to state and federal proceed-
ings.
81 Bloom was charged with criminal contempt for introducing a false will to probate. He
was denied a jury trial and convicted and sentenced to prison for twenty-four months. 391
U.S. at 195. To determine whether he was wrongly deprived of a jury trial, the Court ex-
plored whether his offense could be considered serious, and looked to the maximum sentence
authorized by the Illinois legislature. Since no maximum penalty had ever been established,
the Court relied on the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the
offense. Id at 211. It concluded that a two-year prison sentence was serious and that Bloom
was entitled to a jury trial. Id
82 Id at 202. The Court declared that "in terms of those considerations which make the
right to a jury trial fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference between
serious contempts and other serious crimes." Id
83 Id at 211.
84 See Kuhns, supra note 67, at 498-99 (precedent for maximum contempt penalties has
been established).
85 The United States Code defines offenses as petty if their penalties do not exceed impris-
onment for a period of six months or a fine of five hundred dollars. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1969).
But, the five hundred dollars fine by itself has not served as an indicator that "serious punish-
ment is contemplated." In Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court refused to
grant a jury trial in a case where a union had been fined $10,000 for being in contempt of
court. "[W]e cannot say that the fine of $10,000. . .was a deprivation of such magnitude
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D. THE FEDERAL CONTEMPT STATUTE
The contempt power of the federal courts has been statutorily re-
stricted to three types of misbehavior.8 6 Police misconduct punishable
as contempt under the present statute must fit under one of these cate-
gories: (1) misconduct in the court's presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice; (2) misbehavior of court officers;
(3) disobedience of the court's "writ, process, order, rule, decree or com-
mand."
8 7
The fourth amendment violations by the police probably would not
fit under either of the first two categories. Conduct punishable under
the first category88 must occur in or close to the courtroom. 89 The sec-
ond category, "officers of the court," typically applies to judges, mar-
shalls, bailiffs and all others whose services are rendered solely for
judicial purposes.90 Attorneys9' and law enforcement personnel 92 are
not considered officers of the court for purposes of this statute.
To punish police misbehavior as contempt, the misconduct must be
construed as disobedience of a court order. The courts would need to
issue some type of decree, order, or set of rules which would specify di-
rectives and prohibitions for police behavior.93 Officers would be held
that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or mistake." Id at 477. Thus, a
criminal contempt case in which the penalty could be a fine exceeding five hundred dollars
may not always necessitate a jury trial. Compare Girard v. Goins, 575 F.2d 160, 163-65 (8th
Cir. 1978) ($500 fine establishes no entitlement to jury trial, but fines between $2,500 and
$10,000 indicate that contempts are serious) with Richmond Black Police Officers v. City of
Richmond, 548 F.2d at 127 (fine exceeding $500 means the contempt is serious and requires a
jury trial.)
86 See note 31 supra for text of 18 U.S.C. § 401, the federal contempt statute. Most state
contempt statutes are patterned after the federal law. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
58, at 218-19. Most states, however, provide courts with broader contempt powers than does
the federal statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. JUD.
LAW §§ 750 (criminal), 753 (civil) (McKinney 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-9-102 (1980);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.20.010 (1961).
87 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).
88 Id § 401(1). Most courtroom disruptions are punished under this subsection. These
disruptions can be either confrontative or subversive. In both cases, the court shall use its
contempt power to assure parties the opportunity to be heard and to prevent a loss in the
court's dignity and authority. See Dobbs, sutpra note 35, at 186-87.
89 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941).
90 Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1955) (The category of officers subject to
§ 401(2) should not be expanded beyond the group of persons who serve as conventional
court officers and are treated as such in the laws.)
91 In Cammer, an attorney was held not to be an officer of the court for purposes of con-
tempt punishment. Id
92 The only instances in which law enforcement officials have been punished for contempt
as court officers are when they have been entrusted with the custody of prisoners. See, e.g.,
Fanning v. United States, 72 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1934) (sheriff permitted escape of prisoners).
93 The Supreme Court has been authorized to prescribe procedural rules for criminal
proceedings, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1969), civil actions, admiralty cases, and proceedings for
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in contempt only if they disobeyed one of these directives or prohibitions
during a search or seizure.
The order itself would be determinative of the validity of a con-
tempt sanction for disobedience. The order must be clear and specific,
leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is
addressed. 94 Court decrees will not be expanded or twisted by implica-
tion beyond the plain meaning of their terms. 95 However, the parties to
whom an order is directed must obey its commands even if the com-
mands are later declared invalid. 96 Courts have held persons in con-
tempt for disobeying orders which are eventually found invalid.
9 7
III. POLICE AND THE COURTS
A. DISOBEDIENCE PUNISHED BY CONTEMPT
The contempt sanction has been used by the courts to punish police
disobedience of judicial orders, but instances of this application are rare.
The Supreme Court's only approval of the contempt sanction
judicial review or enforcement of administrative orders or Tax Court decisions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (Supp. 1979). Federal courts have authority to make and establish rules for the con-
duct of their business, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1959) and FED. R. Civ. P. 83. Court rules have been
deemed the most effective means by which courts can impose sanctions on disrespectful attor-
neys. See Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U.
CHI. L. REv. 619, 633-36 (1977). This rulemaking power is limited to judicial activities.
The rulemaking power is not analogous to a power to make rules for police behavior.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in a search and seizure case, could end the confusion now
prevalent in fourth amendment law by setting out guidelines for what police can and cannot
do under the Constitution. It is unlikely, however, that such a ruling, if issued, would be
construed as a "lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command," disobedience of which
would be punished as contempt. Most federal courts have been reluctant to exercise their
contempt powers in cases not falling within the confines of a narrow construction of the con-
tempt statute. See, Note, Federal Courts-Contempt, 52 VA. L. REV. 1556, 1563 (1966).
94 See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967);
In re Brown, 454 F.2d at 1008 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Justice Holmes, in Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 401 (1905), observed that "the defendants ought to be informed as
accurately as the case permits what they are forbidden to do." See also Chapman v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel., Co., 613 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (criminal contempt is established when
there is willful disobedience of a clear and definite order).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1973), afd
508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). The case also points out that while stretching will not occur, the
order will be read in light of the purpose for which it was entered, and thus may be subjected
to a reasonable interpretation. Id
96 "Persons who make private determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order gen-
erally risk criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect." Manness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975). See also United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at
294; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922); ITT Community Development Corp. v.
Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978).
97 See, e.g., Dolman v. United States, 439 U.S. 1395 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978). See
also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967); United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. at 293-94; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. at 189-90.
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against law enforcement officers occurred over seventy years ago in
United States v. Ship p.98 Ed Johnson, a black man, had been convicted of
raping a white woman by a Tennessee court. He appealed his death
sentence to the Supreme Court, which temporarily stayed all state pro-
ceedings. The Court also ordered the Hamilton County sheriff, Joseph
Shipp, to hold Johnson in custody pending appeal. 9 9 When word of the
Court's action reached Hamilton County, a mob quickly formed to
lynch the prisoner. Although Shipp knew of this impending threat of
violence, he sent all his guards home and left only the night watchman
in charge of the jail. 100 That night, the mob stormed the jailhouse and
murdered Johnson. 101 The Court held that Shipp had failed to make
any preparation to resist the threatened violence, and in fact, aided and
abetted the actions of the mob.' 0 2 His "utter disregard of [the] Court's
mandate. . . and defiance of the Court's orders" justified a finding of
criminal contempt. 0 3 Shipp was sentenced to ninety days imprison-
ment for his contempt, while one of his deputies received a sixty day
sentence. 104
Civil contempt has been used to respond to police disobedience of
court orders. Unlike the punitive measures in Shipp, the civil sanctions
were meant either to coerce police compliance with the order, or to com-
pensate victims of the contempt.10 5
Hicks v. Knight 106 involved police misconduct during civil rights
demonstrations in Bogalusa, Louisiana. A federal district court enjoined
police officials and officers from failing to protect the demonstrators
from harassment and assaults. Three weeks later, the same court held
the police chief and the public safety commissioner in civil contempt. 
0 7
They were fined $100 a day and sentenced to remain in the custody of
the Attorney General until they demonstrated compliance with the
court order by following the court's eight-point plan.10 8 A police officer
98 214 U.S. 386 (1909).
99 United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 571 (1906).
100 United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. at 412.
101 Id at 414. The mob's tactics were ugly and shocking. After breaking down the pris-
oner's cell door with sledgehammers, the vigilante mob brought the prisoner to a nearby
bridge. Twice they tried, unsuccessfully, to hang Johnson from this bridge. Johnson was then
shot to death by members of the mob.
102 Id at 423.
103 Id at 420.
104 Shipp v. United States, 215 U.S. 580, 582 (1909).
105 See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
106 Civil Action No. 15727 (E.D. La. 1965), repiorledin 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1504 (1965).
107 Id at 1506.
108 Id at 1507-08. The plan included a requirement that the police department develop a
comprehensive program "for police coverage in the City of Bogalusa including coverage of all
picketing and demonstrations." The program was to contain specific written instructions as
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under their charge was also held in civil contempt for refusing to obey
the court's initial order. His $25 a day fine continued until he agreed to
follow the court order. 109
In Clark v. Boynton,1I 10 another civil contempt sanction was issued to
misbehaving police officers. In the spring of 1965, white policemen in
Selma, Alabama prevented blacks from registering to vote. The federal
district court, through a temporary restraining order, prescribed certain
registration procedures. Law enforcement officials were directed not to
intimidate or harass any citizens attempting to register."' About two
weeks after the order's issuance, Sheriff James Clark and his deputies
were confronted by nearly two hundred young black demonstrators at
the county courthouse. The sheriff and about twenty deputies sur-
rounded the teenagers and forced them to march for several miles
through the streets of Selma. For this action, the district court held
Sheriff Clark in "direct contempt" of its order and fined him $1,500.112
The Fifth Circuit vacated the contempt order because of the district
court's failure both to specify whether the contempt was civil or crimi-
nal and to provide necessary procedural safeguards for the sheriff."1
3
On remand, the district court modified its order and found Clark in civil
contempt." 4 Upon the presentation of affidavits showing evidence of
damages suffered as a result of the forced march, Clark was ordered to
pay $1,505 "as partial compensation for [plaintiffs] losses suffered as a
result of his civil contempt."'"15
Hicks and Clark demonstrate the inherent problems with civil con-
tempt sanctions for police misconduct. Inasmuch as civil contempt is
punished indeterminately, courts would constantly need to monitor the
contemnor's behavior to determine when the open-ended sentence could
be lifted." 6 Judicial resources would be strained considerably by this
task. Furthermore, sentences which would terminate on a showing of
good behavior would be much less of a deterrent than definite punitive
criminal contempt sanctions.
to the duties of each officer and written assurances from the officer that he understood and
would comply with the program.
109 Id at 1508-09.
110 362 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1966).
III Id at 994 n.4.
112 Id at 994-95.
113 Id at 995-97.
114 Boynton v. Clark, Civil Action No. 3559-65 (S.D. Ala. 1965), reported in 12 RAcE REL.
L. REP. 620 (1967).
115 Id at 621.
116 See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
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B. ORDERS GRANTED AGAINST THE POLICE
Courts have granted injunctions against persistent patterns of po-
lice misconduct. Disobedience of these orders could have been punished
with contempt sanctions. In Allen v. Mendrano,117 the Supreme Court
upheld a district court order prohibiting Texas police officers from un-
justifiably interfering with union organizing efforts.' 18 Thirty-five years
earlier, in Hague v. CYO,' 19 the Court upheld similar relief against police
officers who sought to crush a rising labor union.120 The orders in both
cases did not restrain any lawful police conduct. 121 Lower federal courts
have also granted injunctive relief against police misconduct.
122
The power of federal courts to enjoin police misconduct is not un-
117 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
118 In 1966-67, attempts were made to unionize the Mexican-American farmworkers of the
lower Rio Grande Valley. Local and state police officers allegedly used unlawful arrests,
detentions and confinements to intimidate the organizers. The union efforts collapsed after a
year of constant police pressure. Id at 809. The federal district court, upon the union's
request, issued an injunction specifically prohibiting the police from using their authority to
arrest, stop, disperse or imprison the plaintiffs without adequate cause. Id. at 811 n.7. Ade-
quate cause was defined as either (1) unreasonable interference with public or private pass-
ways, (2) force or violence, or (3) probable cause to believe a crime had been, or was about to
be, committed. Id at 814. The Court felt this injunction was appropriate in light of the
persistent pattern of police misconduct. Id at 815.
119 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
120 In 1937, the CIO, an organization established to organize workers into labor unions,
launched a drive for members in Jersey City, New Jersey. City officials, believing the CIO to
be a Communist organization, prevented CIO leaders from holding public meetings and,
eventually, from remaining in the city. The Supreme Court upheld an injunction which
enjoined Jersey City police from: (1) interfering with the union leaders' free access to the
city's streets and parks; (2) removing union leaders from the city; (3) enforcing a void ordi-
nance which prevented the union from publicly distributing their leaflets and handbills; and
(4) enforcing an ordinance requiring permits for any public gathering. Id. at 517-18.
121 See Allee v. Mendrano, 416 U.S. at 815.
122 See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). The Fourth Circuit upheld
an injunction which prohibited the Baltimore police from continuing to search homes on the
basis of anonymous phone tips and without warrants. During a massive 19-day effort to
locate two blacks suspected of the shootings of various policemen, over 300 warrantless
searches were conducted by the police, all in the city's black community. The court called the
effort "a series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever to come under the scrutiny of a
federal court." Id at 201.
See also NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820
(1967) (police enjoined from interfering with lawful protests against racial discrimination).
See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, at 46-48; Comment, Federal Injunctive Relieffiom
Illegal Searches, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104; Note, supra note 6.
A comprehensive order restricting intelligence gathering activities of the Chicago Police
Department is being considered by a federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois. The
order has been proposed pursuant to a consent decree which settled two class action suits
which alleged unconstitutional spying by the Chicago Police. Alliance to End Repression v.
City of Chicago, No. 74-C-3268 (N.D. Ill., agreement signed April 24, 1981); American Civil
Liberties Union v. City Of Chicago, No. 75-C-3295 (N.D. Ill., agreement signed April 24,
1981). If the final order reflects the terms agreed to in the consent decree, it will contain a
number of limits on the search and seizure procedures used by the Chicago police.
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limited. A persistent pattern of misbehavior, rather than an isolated in-
cident, must be shown before an injunction will be granted. 23 Thus, an
allegation of a single unlawful search was held insufficient to support an
injunction against police search tactics in Long v. District of Columbia.
124
The appellate court not only required a pattern of unlawful police ac-
tion, but "a substantial risk that future violations will occur." 125
The Supreme Court has also restricted federal court intervention in
local law enforcement activity. In Rizzo v. Goode,126 the Court refused to
uphold a district court injunction requiring the Philadelphia police de-
partment to develop a comprehensive civilian complaint procedure.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that the injunction was
a sharp limitation on the police department's latitude in its own internal
affairs, 127 and that the principles of federalism required the injunction's
dismissal. 128
The Riwzo holding would not prohibit the contempt alternative.
Rzzo applied to an injunction regulating the internal affairs of a police
department.129 The search and seizure methods of a police department
are not internal affairs. Moreover, the contempt alternative should not
123 See, e.g., Allee v. Mendrano, 416 U.S. at 815; Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d at 202.
124 469 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The D.C. Court of Appeals refused to grant injunctive
relief against police misconduct because, among other reasons, a single unlawful stop and
frisk incident was not enough to demonstrate a pattern of unlawful police conduct. Id at 932.
125 Id Butsee Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
333 (1980). In Lyons, the Ninth Circuit held that a citizen had standing to seek injunctive
relief to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department's use of stranglehold controls in non-life-
threatening situations. The plaintiff sought the injunction after he allegedly had been ren-
dered unconscious by a stranglehold applied by officers who had stopped him for a traffic
violation. 615 F.2d at 1244. The Ninth Circuit found the use of these holds to be "accepted
police practice, even in non-life-threatening situations." Id at 1246. Although the plaintiff's
claim was based on only one stranglehold incident, the court believed the claim could be
heard because "there is a strong possibility of recurrence of this police tactic." Id at 1248.
The actual injunction against the Los Angeles Police Department has been stayed by the
Ninth Circuit pending appeal.
126 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
127 Id at 379. The injunction was ordered by the District Court after a long trial involving
a series of police violations of the constitutional rights of Philadelphia minority group mem-
bers. The injunction directed the Philadelphia police to draft a comprehensive program for
adequately dealing with civilian complaints. Id at 369. The district court suggested guide-
lines for this program, and appropriate revisions of police manuals and rules of procedure
were to be major parts of this program. Id at 369-70. The District Court saw its order as a
necessary first step in its attempt to prevent future police abuses. Id at 370.
128 Id at 378. Justice Rehnquist recognized that federalism governs the relationship be-
tween federal courts and state governmental branches in ongoing criminal proceedings. Id at
380. He also noted that the principles of federalism are applicable when certain injunctive
relief is sought against a local police department. Id When the district court "injected itself
by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of [the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment]," the Court held that it had departed from those principles. Id See also Lewis v. Hy-
land, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1977).
129 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 380.
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be based on individual district court injunctions against local police de-
partments. Rather, in the interest of uniformity of constitutional inter-
pretation, the Supreme Court should issue the order which police
officers would be required to obey under threat of contempt.
IV. REVISING THE PROPOSAL
The Wigmore-inspired contempt proposal is not a realistic alterna-
tive to the exclusionary rule. Its attractive simplicity and efficiency
would not be possible given the limited indirect contempt powers of
American courts. Therefore, the Wigmore model must be modified
before a viable contempt alternative can be evaluated.
A. TYPE OF CONTEMPT
Wigmore called for the misbehaving police officer to be prosecuted
for contempt of the Constitution. 130 Although this suggestion is an in-
ventive way to characterize fourth amendment violations, American
courts are limited to civil and criminal contempt of court sanctions.
Both types have distinct advantages and drawbacks for the contempt
alternative.
Courts might justify the use of civil sanctions as a means to compel
future compliance with the fourth amendment. Civil contempt would
be easier to establish than criminal contempt because it requires no
showing of willfulness and only a preponderance of the evidence.
13'
Courts which try to use the least available power when resorting to con-
tempt might prefer coercive civil penalties over punitive criminal meas-
ures.13 2 The indeterminate nature of the civil contempt penalty,
however, would require continuing court involvement following sen-
tencing.13 3 This strain on judicial resources and the questionable deter-
rent value of civil contempt sanctions 34 outweigh any advantages.
Therefore, civil contempt sanctions would not be a practical remedy for
police violations.
130 See note 22 supra for further treatment of Wigmore's "contempt of the Constitution"
concept.
131 In the hypothetical illustrating Wigmore's contempt proposal, if Officer Bumbling's
actions were not willful, the judge might use a civil contempt sanction to coerce Bumbling's
compliance with approved search and seizure procedures. Bumbling would be fined $500,
but since civil contempt requires that the punishment terminate on a showing of compliance,
see note 41 supra, the fine could be refunded to him if he was not found guilty of any similar
convictions during the next twelve months.
132 Some courts, aiming to employ "the least possible power" when resorting to contempt
punishment consider the coercive civil contempt sanction before the harsher punitive crimi-
nal contempt measure. See note 39 sura.
133 Se note 43 & accompanying text sura.
134 See note 44 supra.
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The purpose of the contempt alternative suggests that criminal con-
tempt sanctions would be the preferable remedy for police misconduct.
The contempt alternative aims to deter police misconduct by directly
punishing officers for actions that violate the Constitution.1 3 5 Since
criminal contempt punishes completed acts while civil contempt coerces
future compliance, the police violation should be punished as criminal
contempt.1 3 6 However, because it demands some showing of willfulness
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, criminal sanctions may be diffi-
cult to secure for many police violations.1 3 7  Despite these proof
problems, the determinate, punitive criminal contempt sanction would
be the more appropriate punishment for police misbehavior under the
contempt alternative.
B. NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE PUNISHMENT
Assuming the officer's misconduct did not take place in the court's
presence, he could not be punished summarily-he would be entitled to
both notice and hearing before contempt punishment would be consid-
ered. If, during the criminal defendant's trial, the judge believed there
was evidence of illegal police conduct, he could order a contempt hear-
ing on the matter.1 38 This hearing would take place shortly after the
defendant's trial, regardless of its outcome, either before the same judge
or a new one.
1 39
The due process requirements are necessary to assure fair treatment
of the officer. These requirements, however, reduce the efficiency of the
contempt alternative. Full hearings to determine whether an officer
should be held in contempt probably would require more court time
than is presently needed for most motions to suppress. Yet, this burden
135 See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra for discussion of the purposes of criminal con-
tempt.
136 Professor Goldfarb stated that disobedience of court orders, which police misconduct
must be construed as under the contempt alternative, is characteristically considered civil
contempt, unless the disobedience is of a gravity which would suggest some public interest.
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 67. Police disobedience is clearly of significant public inter-
est.
137 See notes 46, 55 & accompanying text supra.
138 Since the defense attorney would have little incentive to pursue a contempt conviction
against the offending officer, the judge presiding in a criminal case would need to be particu-
larly alert for police violations of the fourth amendment. See S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at
72.
139 Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the disqualification of
the trial judge from hearing the criminal contempt case if the contempt charged involves
disrespect or criticism of a judge. This provision is meant to prevent any personality clashes
from interfering with the expected impartiality of the contempt hearing. A change ofjudges
may not be necessary, however, when the contempt is not a personal attack on the judge, as in
the case of police misconduct. Cf Kuhns, supra note 67, at 529 (fear that even a new judge
could be prejudiced by the assessment of seriousness made by the original judge).
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on the crowded court schedules might be justified if the contempt alter-
native is shown to be an improved protector of citizens' fourth amend-
ment rights.
Neither the defense attorney nor the prosecutor in the earlier crimi-
nal case would be likely to accept the responsibility of prosecuting the
officer at his contempt hearing. The defense attorney would have little
incentive to prosecute a police officer because the potential contempt
conviction could not be used as evidence in his client's appeal.140 The
prosecuting attorney would be reluctant to prosecute the same officer
who brought in the criminal, since prosecutors rely on maintaining good
relations with the police. 14' Moreover, the prosecutor might not treat
contempt cases as seriously as his other criminal cases.
142
The court would have to supply the prosecutor of the offending
officer. The court can appoint a United States attorney or a private
lawyer to prosecute criminal contempt cases.143 Since appointment may
not be feasible if a large number of misconduct cases arose, the court
might instead hire a special prosecuting team to handle all contempt
cases brought against the police. These special prosecutors would be
affiliated with the court, and to prevent any conflicts of interest, would
be entirely separate from the prosecutor's office. Their sole responsibil-
ity would be to conduct all investigative, procedural and prosecutorial
tasks beginning with the court's contempt notice and continuing until
the final verdict of the judge hearing the case. 144
C. RESTRICTING AND EXPANDING PUNISHMENT OPTIONS
Courts issuing contempt punishments would not be limited to the
thirty-day prison terms suggested by Wigmore. The contempt statute
presently permits the use of fines or imprisonment as contempt sanc-
tions.145 Judges who impose fines on officers should prohibit any contri-
bution from the department or the governmental employer to maximize
140 An officer's contempt conviction for an illegal search would not be relevant to the de-
fendant's guilt. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state rules of evidence, only
relevant evidence is admissible. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402.
141 S. SCHLESINGER, sup/ra note 2, at 72.
142 Kuhns, supra note 67, at 511.
143 See L. ORFIELD, supra note 64, at § 42.28.
144 Virgil Peterson proposed the appointment of a separate Civil Rights Office "charged
solely with the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting alleged violations of the Consti-
tution by law enforcement officials." Peterson, Restricions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 45, 62 (1957).
145 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1966). Civil contempt sanctions have not been limited to fines or
imprisonment. See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. at 193-95 (defendant
ordered to pay back wages to employees). Some observers have suggested that the contempt
statute only limits the criminal, and not the civil, contempt power. See Note, supra note 93, at
1560. Cf Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947) ("We assume, arguendo, that the
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the deterrent effect on the officer. Prison terms for police contempt
should be limited to a maximum of six months to prevent demands for
jury trials,1 46 which should be avoided because they are time-consum-
ing, expensive, and awkward. Moreover, doubts have been raised over
the impartiality of jurors considering punishment for officers who have
interfered with the rights of a convicted criminal.' 4 7 To compensate for
this six-month ceiling on prison sentences, the sentencing options should
be legislatively expanded to include promotion restrictions or suspen-
sions of officers from duty,,' 48 constituting intermediate punishments
between fines and imprisonment. Overzealous officers, probably the
most likely violators of search and seizure rules, would find the tempo-
rary loss of their patrol a strong deterrent against prohibited conduct. 149
D. PRIOR COURT ACTION
To be punished as contempt, police misconduct must be construed
as the disobedience of a court order.°5 0 Modern courts do not have the
sweeping power that existed under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to punish
"all contempts of authority";' 5 ' rather, punishable contempt is limited
to three types of conduct. Disobedience of a court's "writ, process, or-
der, rule, decree, or command"' 52 is the only category under which po-
statute allowing fine or imprisonment governs civil as well as criminal contempt proceed-
ings.")
146 See notes 84-85 & accompanying text supra.
Whatever their length, prison sentences for law enforcers demand careful consideration
by judges. Police officers would be subject to greater risks of violence than most prisoners
since they represent the forces that put many inmates behind bars. However, if judges seri-
ously considered prison terms for serious police misconduct, and the officers were aware of
this possibility, the threat of imprisonment could be one of the strongest deterrents against
police misbehavior.
147 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 18, at 261.
A recent study of § 1983 suits against the police revealed a definite jury bias for the
police side. Project, Suing the Police, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 788-809 (1979).
148' Courts having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States may place a defend-
ant on probation, whether his offense is punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1981 Supp.). Courts can couple probation with necessary and proper conditions. See
United States v. Fultz, 482 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1973). In United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553
F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1977), an officer who struck a private citizen and arrested him without
probable cause was punished under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). His two year probation sentence
was conditioned upon his resignation from the police force. 553 F.2d at 724.
If promotion restrictions or suspensions were not coupled with probation, courts may
need legislative assistance to so expand its sentencing options. Court restrictions on police
employment or promotion decisions could be construed as the interference with a depart-
ment's internal affairs which Rizzo v. Goode prohibited. See 423 U.S. at 379 and note 127 supra.
149 See Oaks, supra note 6, at 710 (special impact of promotion restrictions or departmental
discipline).
150 See text accompanying note 93 supra.
151 See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
152 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).
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lice misconduct could be classified. Thus, the first step in implementing
a contempt alternative must be the issuance of an order regarding police
search and seizure procedures.
The order to police officers would have to be clear. The order
could not simply require officers always to comply with the fourth
amendment; one cannot be held in contempt for disobeying a vague
order.153 To avoid vagueness problems, the order should specifically in-
form police of: (1) their duties under the order; (2) conduct prohibited
by the order, and (3) the potential punishment for disobedience. A
court attempting to frame an order encompassing the totality of fourth
amendment law will face a monumental task. A possible approach to
this problem would involve the court's solicitation of suggestions and
comments from interested parties, such as police and citizens' groups
and legal scholars.154 Using the expertise of these groups, a court would
be better able to formulate a clear and specific order.
The order might be more than just an opening for the courts' use of
their contempt powers. The law of search and seizure has degenerated
into confusing technicalities; 155 if the order clearly explains proper
search and seizure methods, fourth amendment law could be easier to
understand. Some commentators have remarked that police officers
break the law simply because they have no idea what it is.156 The Bos-
ton Police Task Force recently prepared a booklet of guidelines for vari-
ous criminal investigation procedures. 157 Their highly readable work
demonstrates the potential value of clear directives for the police.
To achieve some uniformity in the interpretation of fourth amend-
ment law, the Supreme Court should formulate the order and apply it
to all American police departments. As it considered another difficult
fourth amendment problem, the Court might choose to avoid creating
another exception to the exclusionary rule and to eliminate the rule en-
153 See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. at 76.
'54 See Developments In the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1067 (1965).
155 See Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 4, at 227: "The Burger Court, in attempting both
to maintain the rule and to limit its effect, has found it necessary to resort to dubious distinc-
tions which appear increasingly arbitrary."
156 See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Juge5s Role in Making and Reviewing
Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1005 (1965); Burger, supra note 5, at 11:
"The basic training of a policeman is rarely adequate to make him understand what he can
and cannot do in all situation; it is unlikely that without some special effort and outside help
he will ever understand what he did wrong in a given case." See also I W. LAFAvE, supra note
3, at 24-25; Oaks, supra note 6, at 730-31.
157 BOSTON POLICE TASK FORCE, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES (1978). This
249-page booklet covers procedures involving search warrants, searches incident to arrest,
motor vehicle searches, stop and frisk, arrest, and eyewitness identification. Its language is
clear and is free of confusing legal and policy considerations, which are contained in a sepa-
rate volume. The work, though lengthy, can be comprehended by the average law enforce-
ment officer.
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tirely. In its place, the Court might substitute a decree specifying the
duties of a police officer under the fourth amendment. Disobedience of
the decree would be punished as contempt. The simple structure of this
suggestion collapses, however, on consideration of the constitutional re-
quirements for a judicial order.1
58
V. EVALUATING THE CONTEMPT ALTERNATIVE
A. STRENGTHS
The contempt alternative would have numerous advantages over
the exclusionary rule as a protector of fourth amendment rights. The
alternative would have a greater deterrent effect on police, provide
greater flexibility in dealing with police misconduct, permit reliable,
though tainted, evidence to enter a trial, and expand the courts' reach to
other fourth amendment violations.
Police would be more effectively deterred because the impact of a
contempt sanction would fall directly on the offending officer, while the
officer is punished only indirectly, if at all, by the exclusionary rule.' 59
Improper police activity under the contempt alternative would subject
the officer to a loss in his wallet, his tenure, or even his freedom. Sup-
pression of evidence rarely results in any discipline of the officer; 160 in-
stead, the burden falls on the prosecutor who had no role in the illegal
conduct.161 Holding the officer directly accountable for his illegal acts
would appreciably deter violations of constitutional rights.162 Although
conclusive data is not available to support the deterrence value of either
suppression or contempt sanctions, 163 some improvement in deterrence
158 See notes 182-84 & accompanying text infra.
159 S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 57: "If one examines the effects of the rule, it is clear
that its impact falls only indirectly on the policeman . . . Suppression does not affect his
official status as a policeman; he is not censured by his fellow officers or the Court. It simply
lets the criminal go free."
Justice Jackson remarked that "[r]ejection of [the] evidence does nothing to punish the
wrongdoing official." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
160 Oaks, supra note 6, at 710, 727. If an officer is disciplined because of his conduct in a
search or seizure, it will be for failure to meet the norms within the police organization, not
the rules set by judicial decisions. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 219, 224 (1966).
Professor Oaks notes that "judicial review by means of the exclusionary rule does not have a
reforming effect over competing norms of police behavior [because t]he rule arises out of a
review of an individual officer, not a challenge to the policy of a department." Oaks, upra
note 6, at 729. (Professor Oaks is presently a Justice on the Utah Supreme Court.)
161 Id at 726: "The immediate impact of the exclusionary rule falls not upon the police
but upon the prosecutor who is attempting to obtain a conviction. . . But the prosecutor is
not the guilty party in an illegal arrest or search or seizure, and he rarely has any measure of
control over the police who are responsible."
162 See Peterson, supra note 144, at 62; S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 85.
163 See note 16 supra.
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should result from the direct punishment of police officers. 164 The
amount of improvement would partly depend on the severity and cer-
tainty of punishment for police misconduct. 165 Given the Supreme
Court's emphasis on deterrence in justifying retention of the exclusion-
ary rule, 166 any improvement in deterrence of police misconduct would
be important.
The contempt alternative would permit the introduction of reliable
evidence despite police misconduct. The excluded evidence is typically
reliable, and often "the most probative information bearing on the guilt
or innocence of the defendant."' 167 Thus, exclusion of improperly ob-
tained evidence usually results in the defendant's release. 168 Rather
than increasing public respect for the courts, this result may cause them
to appear foolish.16 9 By admitting reliable but tainted evidence into the
defendant's trial and then punishing the wrongdoing official, the con-
tempt alternative permits the courts to punish two guilty persons rather
than none. 170 Public respect for the judiciary will not diminish if courts
use illegally obtained evidence to reach the truth and then punish'any
public officer involved in the illegality.
A wide variety of sanctions would be available to courts using the
contempt alternative. Courts could tailor the sanction-fines, imprison-
ment and, with legislative help, suspensions-to the seriousness of the
violation. Officers engaging in outrageously unconstitutional conduct
would receive harsh and swift punishment. Judges also might consider
the officer's past record in assessing punishment; officers who repeatedly
commit minor infractions may require more than a slap on the wrist to
deter further misconduct. Courts could be lenient with officers whose
infractions were committed in the good faith belief that their conduct
was legal. Any sanction assessed for good faith violations would have a
164 See note 20 supra.
165 See id See also F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 161 (effectiveness of a
deterrent depends more on its certainty than its severity).
166 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492.
167 Id at 490.
168 S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 60-61; Peterson, supra note 144, at 55.
169 Id at 61. Judge Wilkey has observed that this result also forces judges presiding over
suppression hearings into awkward, hypocritical positions. When a judge spots a police viola-
tion during a criminal trial, he may overlook the officer's error to prevent the criminal from
going unpunished because certain evidence was suppressed. Judge Wilkey calls for the aboli-
tion of the exclusionary rule and the creation of a system where courts can deal separately
with the criminal and the police. See Wilkey, Let Congress andthe Tal Courts Speak, 62 JUDICA-
TU-RE 351, 355-56 (1979).
170 Dean Wigmore criticized the exclusionary rule for letting both the misbehaving police
officer and the criminal go free. "Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at
the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else." 8 WIGMORE,
upra note 6.
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greater deterrent effect than exclusion.171 The exclusionary rule offers
one remedy-suppression of tainted evidence-for all degrees of police
misconduct. Justice is not served when officers using a deficient search
warrant are treated in the same way as officers who break down a door
to make an unannounced warrantless search.
172
As a replacement for the exclusionary rule, the contempt alterna-
tive could be expanded beyond police violations that are discovered dur-
ing criminal trials. The exclusionary rule is invoked only if illegally
obtained evidence is sought to be introduced at trial, and thus the rule
cannot act against police misconduct which is not directed toward ac-
quiring evidence.173 The rule is therefore inapplicable to a high propor-
tion of police activity.174 Contempt sanctions could be used to punish
fourth amendment violations beyond the reach of the exclusionary rule.
Monitors could be appointed by the courts to assist them in the
substantial investigative and administrative work involved in extending
the contempt alternative beyond police violations revealed at trial. Al-
though the revised model of the contempt alternative provides a special
prosecutor to handle contempt cases, 175 his work should be limited to
the period following the issuance of the contempt notice. Monitors, sim-
ilar to masters, are advisory officials appointed by the court to assist in
the handling of a particular case.176 Courts could appoint monitors to
171 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 435, 459 n.35; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 540
(White, J., dissenting). The Williams majority, which recently created a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule in the Fifth Circuit, see note 3 supra, noted that "[ilt makes no sense to
speak of deterring police officers who acted in the good faith belief that their conduct was
legal by suppressing evidence derived from such actions unless we somehow wish to deter
them from acting at all." 622 F.2d at 642.
172 Chief Justice Burger remarked, in reference to this anomaly: "... [E]very violation
. . . should not evoke the same judicial response. Letting a mouse free in a schoolroom is not
as serious as putting a tiger there and the law would hardly punish these two acts in the same
way." Burger, supra note 5, at 13 n.42.
173 Oaks, supra note 6, at 720.
174 Id Professor Oaks offers a variety of motivations, other than the desire for convictions,
that prompt some police searches and seizures. Among these are confiscations in gambling
and liquor law violations and arrests for the purpose of controlling prostitution. Id at 721-22.
Consideration should be given to the degree to which this type of police behavior should
be restrained. Because of the restraints of the fourth amendment, vices such as gambling and
prostitution cannot be controlled through prosecutions; police are forced to resort to harassing
measures to control these victimless crimes. See J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR
99-100 (1970).
175 See text accompanying note 144 supra.
176 Comment, Use of§ 1983, supra note 6, at 110. That author suggests the use of monitors
by courts as "watchdogs" to ensure that the police comply with an injunction. "Courts are
simply not equipped to supervise the day-to-day operations of police officers by injunction."
Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Masters have been used in the prison
context when corrections officials were unable or unwilling to comply with a court order. See
Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. at 935; Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 986 (D.R.I.
1977).
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hear and investigate citizen complaints of improper police tactics, 177
and, if the monitor concludes that an officer has engaged in unconstitu-
tional activity, he could apply to the court for permission to draw up an
order to show cause against the disobedient officer. Since the monitor
would need a number of assistants to carry out his responsiblities prop-
erly, present budgetary constraints might prevent this extension of the
contempt alternative. Nevertheless, the availability of this option offers
greater flexibility to courts seeking to protect citizens' fourth amend-
ment rights.
B. WEAKNESSES
The contempt alternative has a number of serious problems. The
problems inherent with punishing law enforcement officers and the po-
tential deterrence of lawful police conduct are relatively minor weak-
nesses. However, the considerable difficulties in framing the necessary
order and in justifying a court's involvement would ultimately prevent
the contempt alternative from serving as a remedy for all fourth amend-
ment violations by police.
The contempt alternative will punish officers and could affect the
manpower levels of police departments. If officers are suspended with-
out pay or imprisoned for fourth amendment violations, police depart-
ments will need to hire more persons to guarantee that sufficient
personnel are available to patrol the streets. Although in many cities,
such as Chicago, waiting lists for police employment are lengthy, the
possibility of punishment for discretionary decisions may discourage
persons from seeking careers in police work. Patrol positions, which
often have the most uncertain guidelines178 and the most dangerous re-
sponsibilities, could be decimated by this added disincentive. Salaries
would need to be increased to compensate for the risk of contempt pun-
ishment. Local governments straining to keep budgets under control
will not appreciate plans which force them to hire more policemen at
177 The Use of§ 1983 Comment suggests that the monitor be an active rather than passive
figure, and seek out information falling within his mandate rather than merely waiting for
complaints to spur him to action. Comment, Use of§ 1983, supra note 6, at 114-15.
Of course, complaints against police misconduct can always be brought in the form of
section 1983 suits for damages or injunctions. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1979). This statute
permits citizens to proceed directly against police officers for "deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws." These suits have many short-
comings as a practical remedy for police misconduct. See Project, supra note 147.
178 Professor Wilson found that patrol duty was not a popular assignment. J. WILSON,
supra note 174, at 52-53. A major reason for this dislike of patrol work is the lack of clearly
defined expectations. Non-patrol personnel have "clearer, less ambiguous objectives . . .
need not get involved in family fights or other hard to manage situations and. . . need not
make hard-to-defend judgments." Id at 53. The additional element of contempt sanctions




The threat of punishment might deter many legal searches and
seizures. Despite the specificity of the court order, officers will encounter
situations demanding responses that cannot be definitely classified as
"prohibited" or "permitted". Faced with the possibility of fines, suspen-
sions or imprisonment, officers will often choose to forego conduct of
questionable legality.'8 0 The officers' reluctance to act might be viewed
as a positive step toward reducing police misconduct. The deterrence of
lawful police conduct could, however, hinder local law enforcement.
The order required by the contempt alternative would be a practi-
cal impossibility. For the police to be held in contempt for disobeying a
court order, the order itself must clearly describe the permissible and
impermissible. If the contempt alternative replaced the exclusionary
rule in all applicable situations, the court would need to enumerate all
fourth amendment violations which could be punished as contempt. Al-
though it might be easier to lay down rules for law enforcement than for
the maintenance of order, '81 a greater number of search and seizure pos-
sibilities will still need to be considered. The commendable guidelines
prepared by the Boston Police Task Force,18 2 though clear and detailed,
would fall short of the specificity required of the triggering order be-
cause they did not treat every possible fourth amendment violation for
which an officer could receive a contempt sanction. Yet, any effort to
treat all search and seizure situations would be too complex and techni-
cal for the average patrolman to understand. Given the competing re-
quirements of clarity and specificity, the order required by the contempt
alternative could not be drawn.
The most glaring flaw of the contempt alternative involves its most
basic element, participation of the judiciary. Even if it could be pre-
pared, the order needed to trigger the contempt alternative could not be
179 Probably a more economical way to adjust to the contempt alternative would be to
improve the selection and training of police officers. Professor Inbau has advocated improved
police selection and training as the most effective means of improving police practices. Se,
e.g., Inbau, Restrictions in the law ofInterrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 78-79
(1958). Emphasis should be on training since, as Professor Wilson maintains, the better edu-
cated segments of the population are unlikely to find police patrol work attractive. J. WiL-
SON, supra note 174, at 281.
180 See, e.g., Comment,Judicial Control, supra note 6, at 162-63.
181 J. WILSON, supra note 174, at 64-66. In examining the patrolman's role, Professor Wil-
son distinguished between law enforcement (where officers bring to the bar ofjustice persons
who had broken a law) and order maintenance (handling behavior that either disturbs or
threatens the public peace or involves face-to-face conflicts between two or more persons). In
both situations, rules cannot always specify whether to intervene. Id at 64-65. However,
Professor Wilson believed that rules on how to intervene could be created for law enforcement
situations, where most searches and seizures arise. Id at 65.
182 See note 157 & accompanying text supra.
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issued by an American court. No court will issue an order binding on all
police departments without the constitutionally required case or contro-
versy before it. 183 A party could attempt to create the necessary case or
controversy by challenging the adequacy of the exclusionary rule as a
safeguard of fourth amendment rights. It is unlikely that a party could
demonstrate both "the likelihood of substantial and immediate irrepara-
ble injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law" which the Supreme
Court requires for the granting of equitable relief.'84 The host of civil
and criminal remedies available for illegal police conduct1 85 would pre-
-vent a showing that the order regulating all police conduct was neces-
sary. Moreover, the injury that would have to be shown for the Court to
issue the expansive order required by the contempt alternative is diffi-
cult to imagine. Without this order, courts could not use their statuto-
rily limited contempt powers to punish misbehaving police officers.'
86
VI. CONCLUSION
The contempt alternative is not a practical replacement for the ex-
clusionary rule. The alternative would seek to punish unconstitutional
actions by police officers with contempt of court sanctions. Since courts
can only use contempt powers in limited instances, police misbehavior
would need to be construed as disobedience of a court order. An expan-
sive court order covering all police conduct and applicable to federal,
state and local law enforcement officers would be needed. Such an or-
der would not only be a monumental undertaking, but would not be
feasible in a system where courts attempt to tailor remedies to the con-
troversies before them. The contempt alternative fails because it re-
quires judicial involvement beyond constitutional limits.
Despite its flaws, the contempt alternative possesses numerous ad-
vantages over exclusion. Deterrence of police misconduct would be im-
proved through the direct punishment of officers. Flexible contempt
183 U.S. CONST. art. III; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968). In Flast, the Court
explains that the business of federal courts is limited to those questions "presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judi-
cial process." Id at 95.
184 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974). In O'Shea, the Supreme Court found that
the plaintiffs, seeking equitable relief against alleged discriminatory practices of an Illinois
judge and magistrate, failed to meet the case or controversy requirement and did not demon-
strate an adequate basis for equitable relief. The Lyons court attributed the O'Shea outcome,
in part, to the plaintiffs' request for massive structural relief which asked a federal court to
"supervise the conduct of state officials and institutions over a long period of time." 615 F.2d
at 1247. The expansive court order needed for the contempt alternative would probably
qualify as the massive structural relief objected to in O'Shea.
185 C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 6, at 37-53 (summary of available remedies against police
misconduct).
186 See text accompanying note 93 supra.
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sanctions could be tailored to fit the seriousness of the infraction. By
providing punishment for its acquisition, the contempt alternative
would permit reliable evidence obtained illegally by police to be used at
the criminal defendant's trial. The contempt alternative could provide
more effective protection for fourth amendment rights while doing less
injury to the truthseeking process.
The advantages of the contempt alternative could be obtained on a
smaller scale than proposed in this Comment. Rather than seeking to
punish all police misconduct with contempt sanctions, courts might
limit such punishment to specific violations. One commentator has pro-
posed contempt sanctions for the delayed arraignments of arrested sus-
pects. 187 Similarly, the contempt alternative could be readily applied to
other types of police conduct for which objective standards can be estab-
lished.
The contempt alternative could be used by a state court experi-
menting with alternatives to the exclusionary rule. In his dissent in Biv-
ens, Chief Justice Burger declared that the exclusionary rule should not
be abandoned until efficient alternatives were developed. 188 A few years
later, in his concurring opinion in Stone v. Powell, the Chief Justice called
for the immediate overruling of the exclusionary rule to "inspire a surge
of activity" toward the development of these alternatives.'8 9 If the ex-
clusionary rule was overruled, 190 state courts might choose to use con-
tempt sanctions as an experimental replacement for the rule.' 9 '
Experimentation could provide data on the effectiveness of the con-
tempt alternative and could lead to legislation 192 approving the con-
tempt alternative in other jurisdictions. This gradual approach to
adoption of the contempt alternative is more realistic than the immedi-
ate use of contempt sanctions for all police misconduct throughout the
country.
The advantages of contempt sanctions could be obtained through
other alternatives. Even if police violations can be construed as the diso-
187 Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 537-40.
188 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 420 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
189 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
190 See note 3 & accompanying text infra.
191 Defendants in the experimental jurisdictions using the contempt alternative who were
convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence might complain that they were denied
equal protection by the inability to suppress the tainted evidence. In order to remedy these
equal protection problems, one commentator has recommended that experimental alterna-
tives be employed as supplements, rather than as temporary replacements, for the exclusion-
ary rule. See Geller, supra note 5, at 689-90.
192 Professor Kamisar supported the Wigmore "contempt of the Constitution concept,"
but believed that authorizing legislation would be necessary. See Kamisar, note 6 supra, at
182-83.
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bedience of a court order, some courts may not approve of the extension
of contempt sanctions to the regulation of police behavior. One propo-
sal suggests that an independent review board, rather than the courts,
determine penalties for police behavior.19 3 Whether a court or an in-
dependent review board is used, the direct punishment of officers, cou-
pled with the admissibility of reliable, tainted evidence, would offer
greater protection for fourth amendment rights and the truthseeking
process than is presently provided by the exclusionary rule.
THOMAS J. KINASZ
193 S. SCHLESINGER, .supra note 2, at 72-76. As in the contempt alternative, illegally ob-
tained evidence could still be used in the criminal trial.
Professor Schlesinger prefers a board over a judge because (1) the board has more time
and resources to investigate alleged misconduct than a judge, and (2) a board would have the
capacity to investigate the possibility that an officer's supervisors encouraged or ordered the
misconduct. As the contempt alternative has been designed in this Comment, however, the
appointment of special prosecutors for police contempt would permit an arm of the court to
adequately pursue police misconduct and a monitor to oversee police action would be able to
oversee police actions that never came out during a criminal trial. Moreover, since the judici-
ary has the responsibility for protecting the Constitution, the sanctioning of misbehaving of-
ficers should remain in the care of a cd-equal branch of government rather than an
independent review board. The practical difficulties in obtaining judicial involvement might
necessitate the use of a non-judicial review board.
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